Ambiguity After Sharm El-Sheikh!
The implementation of the next stages of the Trump plan is shrouded in ambiguity. Even Trump himself expressed doubts about Tony Blair’s future role in Gaza due to a lack of consensus among all parties.
Saber Gol-Anbari, Journalist:
The recent Sharm El-Sheikh meeting was a scene of public diplomacy and diplomatic flattery, lacking any serious substantive debate about Gaza and its future. At the meeting, Trump praised the guests, especially the leaders of Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt, as warmly as he could. However, Trump’s admiration is not limited to a desire to hear sycophancy from others; he himself is skilled in flattering others, exaggerating and praising them, whether to advance his own programs and goals or to elicit sycophantic feelings towards himself. Sisi also went to great lengths by praising Trump and awarding him the “Order of the Nile,” turning Egypt’s hospitality into a display of special respect for the US President. Sisi, who had watched with envy Trump’s recent travels to wealthy Arab countries in the Persian Gulf, and whose country lacked the massive funds and wealth to attract Trump’s attention, tried to win his heart and place Cairo in the spotlight by taking the initiative to invite him to sign the already-signed Gaza ceasefire agreement and create a triumphant image for Trump.
However, the prime scene of flattery at the Sharm El-Sheikh meeting was orchestrated by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Shehbaz Sharif, in English, transcended the boundaries of sycophancy, declaring Trump the most deserving person for the Nobel Peace Prize and even nominating him for it next year. In a tone full of praise, Sharif described Trump as the man the world needs today. Hearing such words involuntarily brings to mind that claim during the 12-day war that Pakistan was even prepared to use nuclear weapons in support of Iran!
Meanwhile, as the Sharm El-Sheikh meeting was held, a new surreal image was being created in the Gaza Strip. Hamas was expanding its security control over the area, and by detaining and physically eliminating those who collaborated with Israel during the war, it likely aimed, alongside restoring security, to flaunt the restoration of its governing power in the area to the players in Sharm El-Sheikh. After the war, suspicious assassinations occurred, in which the well-known Gaza journalist Al-Ja’frawi, the son of Bassem Naim, a Hamas leader, and others were killed. It is said that Israel, by equipping and arming armed cells, wanted to trigger a period of internal conflict in Gaza after the war. But assuming this claim is true, the speed of expanding security control over the Gaza Strip was such that some tribes, like Al-Majayda, accused of collaborating with Israel, handed over their weapons, supported Gaza’s security services, and effectively, little remains of the influential Dughmush clan besides its name. Dozens of members of this clan, which had long-standing issues with Hamas, were arrested on charges of collaborating with Israel and the Yasser Abu Shabab group, and some were executed.
Returning to the Sharm El-Sheikh summit, the bolstered image of Trump as the one who ended the Gaza war—regardless of his verbal guarantees and forcing Netanyahu to announce the end of the war while in the Knesset—could act as a guarantee. After all, ending the Gaza war is currently the most important pillar of the “successful” image Trump has built for himself since returning to power. It can be said that for this reason and others, the Gaza war, in its comprehensive and genocidal dimension, has ended; however, repeated violations of the ceasefire and sporadic attacks will occur.
Simultaneously, the implementation of the next stages of the Trump plan is shrouded in ambiguity. Even Trump himself expressed doubts about Tony Blair’s potential role in Gaza’s future due to a lack of agreement from all parties. Disarming Hamas, the future of governance in Gaza, its reconstruction, the complete Israeli withdrawal, and delivering sufficient aid to the region are the five major challenges for the parties. It is clear that Hamas will not accept disarmament; but judging from its media approach—including avoiding Qassam military parades, refraining from harsh stances and military rhetoric, and a kind of coquetry towards Trump—it is evident that it is managing the situation and does not want to provoke the opposing parties.
In this context, the middle solution for all parties seems to be the transfer of the Gaza Strip’s administration. Through this, Hamas wants to remove the responsibility for reconstructing Gaza and dealing with the various consequences of the war from its shoulders; but by transferring the administration, it will effectively maintain its security control. The opposing parties, through forming this committee, training police forces, and the presence of international forces, want to create a new reality in Gaza over a period of time that gradually limits Hamas’s security and military dominance. But this process is also very time-consuming. Overall, it can be said that in the future, Hamas will face a deadlock in reconstructing Gaza and dealing with the humanitarian consequences of the war, just as the opposing parties will face a deadlock in disarming Hamas and practically ending its governance.
Source: Khorasan Newspaper. No. 21890